

<p>CYBERCALIPHATE</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Moniker and rhetoric suggest support of ISIS ▶ No record of existence prior to initial attack claims in late 2014 ▶ Publicly claimed responsibility for a cyber attack against TV5Monde that was attributed to FANCY BEAR ▶ Group website hosted on IP block used by FANCY BEAR
<p>CYBERBERKUT</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Moniker references the “Berkut,” now disbanded Ukrainian riot police ▶ Emerged in November 2013 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Claims to be a pro-Russia, anti-Ukraine hacktivist group ▶ Took responsibility for cyber attacks targeting German parliament and 2014 Ukrainian elections ▶ Published information supposedly obtained via cyber attacks to the “traitors” page on their website ▶ Targeting consistent with Russian political interests ▶ Some cyber operations overlap with FANCY BEAR’s targeting focus
<p>GUCCIFER 2.0</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Moniker references Guccifer, a Romanian currently serving time for hacking political officials ▶ No record of existence prior to claiming responsibility for the DNC attack in June 2016 ▶ Took public responsibility for cyber attacks linked to two Russia-based groups, FANCY BEAR and COZY BEAR ▶ Disjointed public statements indicate limited technical knowledge
<p>DCLEAKS</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Moniker claims to be a WikiLeaks sub-project ▶ Created in April 2016 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Claims to be a project put together by American hacktivists ▶ Initial publicity related to releasing emails belonging to former U.S. European Command and NATO forces commander ▶ Name server hosting the DCLeaks website previously hosted at least one FANCY BEAR-related domain ▶ Leaks consistent with FANCY BEAR spearphishing attack pattern
<p>ANPOLAND</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Moniker an attempt to appear affiliated with the Anonymous Poland hacktivist group ▶ Twitter account registered in 2010, mostly inactive until August 2016 ▶ Leaked documents and claimed credit for August 2016 WADA and CAS compromises <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Infrastructure used in attacks consistent with FANCY BEAR ▶ Published documents in October 2016 allegedly gathered via a compromise of the Bradley Foundation in the U.S. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Some of the published documents have been proven to be fictitious ▶ No Poland-related cause; posts inconsistent with other, legitimate Anonymous Poland social media accounts